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Amanab Forest Products Limited v PNG Forest Authority (2020)

Dispute over logging rights in West Sepik Province

Logging companies mentioned in this document:

Concessions mentioned in this document:


                                                SC2089
             PAPUA NEW GUINEA
    [IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

                SCM 25 OF 2020

            BETWEEN:
  AMANAB FOREST PRODUCTS LIMITED
                     Appellant

                    AND:
PAUL SAI’I, GUNTHER JOKU, NOAH TAMBI,
 THERESA KAMU, JOSEPHINE GENIA, BOB
TATE and JACOB AREMAN as members of the
            National Forest Board
                 First Respondents

                AND:
 PAPUA NEW GUINEA FOREST AUTHORITY
                Second Respondent

                  AND:
        THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF
            PAPUA NEW GUINEA
                 Third Respondent

                  AND:
        PACIFIC GREEN TIMBER LTD
                 Fourth Respondent

                   AND:
               MINEP LIMITED
                 Fifth Respondent

                      AND:
               MIDOWA LIMITED
on its own and on behalf of named 43 Incorporated
            Land Groups of Walsa FCA
                 Sixth Respondent

             Waigani: Hartshorn, J
           2021: 18th & 19th February

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INJUNCTION - Contested application for a stay and injunctive relief - grounds
for the grant of stay and injunction considered – appellant has demonstrated it
has an arguable case – appellant will be prejudiced if stay order and an interim
injunctive relief is not granted – interim injunction is granted to the appellant

Cases Cited

Joshua Kalinoe v. The State (2010) SC1024
Kawari Fortune Resources Ltd v. Apurel (2015) SC1614

Counsel:

Mr. R. Bradshaw, for the Appellant
Mr. S. Mitige, for the First and Second Respondents
Mr. T. Tape, for the Sixth Respondent

Oral decision delivered on
19th February 2021

1. HARTSHORN J: This is a decision on a contested application for a stay and
injunctive relief. The Appellant seeks:

                a) a stay of a decision of the first respondent to excise or remove
                    17,000 hectares of land area (excised land) from a certain
                    Forest Management Area;

                b)that the first, second and third respondents be restrained from
                   issuing or granting any permit, licence or Forest Clearing
                   Authority (FCA) over the excised land;

                c) that the respondents, their servants and agents to be restrained
                    from engaging in any forest industry activity within or outside
                    the excised land.

Background

2. The appellant appeals the dismissal of a judicial review proceeding by the
National Court.

3. The dispute concerns a timber permit and the excision of part of the land of the
timber permit for an FCA.

4. The appellant holds a timber permit for the area described as Amanab-Blocks

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1-4 and the Imanda Consolidated Forest Management Act at Vanimo, Sandaun
Province (Amanab FMA Area). The Permit is for 35 years from 17th May 2012.

5. The appellant claims that 17,000 hectares of land area forming part of the
Amanab FMA was excised by the first and second respondents to form part of an
FCA. This excision was without the approval, knowledge or consent of the
appellant, contrary to s. 90(A) (2) Forestry Act.

6. An FCA was granted to the fourth respondent on 28th September 2015 for
34,000 hectares and 17,000 of the 34,000 hectares is comprised of the excised land.

7. The appellant commenced a judicial review proceeding to review decisions of
the first and second respondents and leave was granted. That proceeding was
dismissed upon application by the sixth respondent. That dismissal is the subject of
this substantial appeal.

8. The first, second and sixth respondents claim amongst others that:

                    a) the excised land was excised before the timber permit
                    was issued to the appellant and so the appellant’s consent was
                    not required;

                    b)   the FCA to the fourth respondent has been cancelled and
                    a new FCA was granted to the sixth respondent on 2nd
                    November 2020. The new FCA is not the subject of the
                    National Court proceeding and this Supreme Court
                    proceeding;

                    c) events have now overtaken the National and Supreme
                    Court proceedings and a stay would affect a decision which is
                    not the subject of this appeal. A stay would also affect the sixth
                    respondent’s rights.

Consideration

9. The appellant makes application for a stay and injunctive relief pursuant to s.
5(1)(b) Supreme Court Act and the inherent jurisdiction of this court. Counsel for
the sixth respondent objected to this on the basis that reliance upon s. 5(1)(b)
Supreme Court Act was incorrect as it does not provide the necessary jurisdiction.
The wording that was relied upon by the respondent from Joshua Kalinoe v. The
State (2010) SC1024 does not support this proposition. Further, there are numerous
Supreme Court authorities for the proposition that s. 5(1)(b) Supreme Court Act
may be relied upon for a stay and injunction. I refer to Kawari Fortune Resources

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Ltd v. Apurel (2015) SC1614 in this regard.

10. Section 5(1)(b) Supreme Court Act refers to an ‘interim order’ which may be
granted. I am satisfied that a stay or injunction falls within these words.

11. Pursuant to the Kawari Fortune case (supra), in determining whether to make
an interim order pursuant to s.5(1)(b) Supreme Court Act to prevent prejudice to
the claims of the parties, attention should be focused on the following questions:

                    a)    what are the claims of the parties?

                    b)    what is the alleged prejudice?

                    c) what is necessary, pending the hearing and determination
                    of the appeal to prevent the prejudice?

12. The Court held in Kawari Fortune (supra) at [26] that:

                    “Identifying the claims of the parties does not entail reaching
                    any final conclusion on the merits of the claim advanced by the
                    applicant for the interim order, only that the applicant has an
                    arguable case.
                    The claims are to be found in the grounds specified in the
                    notice of appeal or, as the case may be, application for leave to
                    appeal and in the bases upon which those grounds are
                    contested. Where the claim of the applicant appears to be
                    strongly arguable, even comparatively minor prejudice might
                    warrant the making of an interim order....What is involved is
                    the exercise of a judicial discretion in which the two
                    considerations, strength of the applicant’s claim and nature
                    and extent of prejudice interplay, according to the
                    circumstances of a particular case.”

Claims of the Appellant and Arguable Case

13. As to the submission of the sixth respondent that the appeal does not involve
the FCA granted to the sixth respondent, it is clear from the statement filed by the
appellant in the judicial review proceeding that declarations are sought in regard to
the power of the first respondent to excise land the subject of a timber permit. This
concerns the land the subject of the new FCA to the sixth respondent.

14. Next, the first, second and sixth respondents claim that the FCA to the fourth
defendant was granted first in time and therefore the approval of the appellant did
not need to be sought. Although from the affidavits of Mr. Enda and Mr. Tape, it is
apparent that an FCA was granted for 34,000 hectares before the appellant’s timber

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permit was granted, when that FCA was amended on 28th September 2015, in
Schedule 1 of the amendment, it specifically states that on 14th May 2012 – when
the FCA was initially granted - only 17,000 hectares was granted, not 34,000
hectares. It is arguable therefore, as claimed by the appellant, that the second lot of
17,000 hectares was excised after the timber permit had been granted and so the
FCA concerning the excised 17,000 hectares was not first in time. Consequently,
the approval of the appellant was required under s. 90(A)(2) Forestry Act.

15. As to the claim of the appellant and whether it has an arguable case, without in
any way considering the merits of the appeal, I am satisfied from a consideration of
documents before this court, the National Court decision being appealed and the
grounds of appeal, that the appellant has an arguable case on numerous grounds.
These are: the judicial review proceeding not being dismissed on competency
grounds; Order 16 National Court Rules not providing for summary disposal of
proceedings as provided for under Order 12 Rule 40 National Court Rules; an
incorrect application of the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata and in
essence, the reviewing by a National Court of the grant of leave to apply for
judicial review by a previous National Court.

Alleged Prejudice

16. The appellant maintains that it is the holder of the timber permit for the 17,000
hectares. The appellant claims that it is entitled pursuant to the timber permit, the
Forest Development Project Agreement (between itself and the second respondent)
and the Forestry Act to undertake forest industry activities in the 17,000 hectares.

17. The 17,000 hectares was unlawfully excised from the Amanab-Imona FMA
area, the appellant claims.

18. The FCA for the 17,000 hectares was granted to the fourth respondent in breach
of section 90(A)(2) Forestry Act

19. Notwithstanding that the FCA to the fourth respondent was cancelled, on 7th
October 2020, a new FCA was granted to the sixth respondent.

20. Unless restrained, the sixth respondent will undertake logging in the excised
land.

21. The first, second and sixth respondents did not make submissions to the effect
that the appellant would not be prejudiced if the relief sought was not granted. The
first, second and sixth respondents also did not submit that interim orders were not
necessary to prevent prejudice to the claims of the appellant.

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22. I am satisfied that the appellant has made out that it will be prejudiced if the
relief sought is not granted and it is entitled to the relief sought. In short, the
appellant requires interim orders to prevent prejudice to its claims pursuant to s.
5(1)(b) Supreme Court Act.


Orders

23.   It is ordered that:

                     a)     The relief sought in paragraph 1(a) (i), 1(a) (ii) and 1(a)
                     (iii) of the Application filed 16th December 2020 is granted;

                  b) The costs of and incidental to the said Application are
                  costs in the appeal.
__________________________________________________________________
Bradshaw Lawyers: Lawyers for the Appellant
PNG Forest Authority: Lawyers for the First and Second Respondents
Kandawalyn Lawyers: Lawyers for the Sixth Respondent

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