Ting Chiong Ming, the Giant Kingdom Group and its Logging Operations in Papua New Guinea

ACT NOW Limited,
PO Box 5218, Boroko, NCD
Tel: +675 7715 9197
Email: info@actnowpng.org

Date of publication: October 2023

Cover image: Discarded log ends, road clearance, Turubu SABL, East Sepik Province, April 2016 (c)
Global Witness


             The Giant Kingdom Group
                                   Mr Ting Chiong Ming (also written as Chiong Ming Ting)
                   29 January 1981
                                                            Papua New Guinea, Malaysia
                                  Logging, palm oil, shipping, real estate, hospitality and commodity
trading



Ackland Alliance Limited, Continental Venture Limited, Elite Marine Limited, GE Development Limited,
Foyston Development Limited, Global Elite Limited, Global Splendid Investment Limited, Global Star
Corporation Limited, Grand Agriculture Limited, Greenlands Development Limited, Kukusang Plywood
Limited, Mapac Industrial Limited, Pacific Agro Capital Limited, Pacific Elite Investment Limited, Sepik
Oil Palm Plantation Limited, Sepik Palm Oil Limited, Summit Agriculture Limited, Wewak Agriculture
Development Limited.



Giant Kingdom Holdings Sdn Bhd (Malaysia) and its subsidiaries, Giant Kingdom Realty Sdn Bhd, Giant
Kingdom Capital Sdn Bhd, GK Agriculture Sdn Bhd, GK Agriculture Supplies Sdn Bhd, GK Pacific
Limited, GK Shipping Sdn Bhd, GK Worldwide Trading Sdn Bhd, Highland Machinery Sdn Bhd, Luk
Shun Development Sdn Bhd (85%), Pearl Estate Sdn Bhd, GK Green Limited, Mega Power Machinery Sdn
Bhd, Sematan Resort Sdn Bhd, SR Equatorial Sdn Bhd, Collinwood Realty Sdn Bhd.



Credible evidence collated in this report indicates there is a high risk that Giant Kingdom group
companies operating in Papua New Guinea are involved in: (1) illegal logging generating substantial
cash flows; (2) illegal and unsustainable logging of primary tropical rainforests; (3) collusion in large-
scale illegal land acquisitions dispossessing the traditional landowners; and (4) complicity in human
rights abuses. Other risks identified in this report include: (5) opaque offshore structures; (6) negative
findings in a Commission of Inquiry; (7) negative court judgements; and (8) an unfavourable audit
finding.



Given the risks identified in this report, these findings will be of direct relevance to businesses with anti-
money laundering duties and human rights due diligence obligations, with particular application to: (1)
financial institutions – both commercial banks and non-bank lenders; (2) corporate service providers;
(3) accountants; (4) law firms; (5) commodities traders; (6) machinery and service suppliers; (7) shipping
companies and other freight providers.


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The Giant Kingdom group is a conglomerate of associated companies owned wholly or in part by
Malaysian businessperson Mr Ting Chiong Ming. The group’s initial source of wealth appears to derive
primarily from large-scale tropical logging operations in Papua New Guinea. However, over the past
decade, the Giant Kingdom group has diversified with significant assets in Malaysia, in sectors such as
real estate, hospitality, commodities trading and shipping.

This risk alert:
    • documents the group’s logging operations in Papua New Guinea;
    • presents evidence indicating that the group is involved in serious, improper practices; and
    • outlines the risks these practices pose to business stakeholders involved in the provision of
      regulated services and/or who have a commitment to human rights compliance in their business
      dealings.


Close attention in this report is given to the logging operations of Summit Agriculture Limited (and
closely linked entity Wewak Agriculture Development Limited) and Global Elite Limited. Both are
registered in Papua New Guinea and they are principally owned by Ting Chiong Ming.
Summit Agriculture and Global Elite are engaged in large-scale tropical forest logging. Since 2011, they
have exported over 1.7 million cubic metres of tropical round logs from more than 20 different logging
concessions in Papua New Guinea.3 Those logs have a declared value of over US$150 million.

The majority of the log exports (82%) have come from just two logging concessions, Wewak Turubu and
Wammy. Both concessions are operated under a type of licence called a Forest Clearance Authority
(FCA) issued by the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority.

Based on the evidence reviewed, the risk alert finds:
    ● There is a high risk that both the Wewak Turubu and Wammy FCAs were unlawfully issued in
      breach of key requirements of the Forestry Act 1991.
    ● There is a high risk that Global Kingdom group companies have been involved in illegal logging
      within the Wewak Turubu and Wammy area FCAs.
    ● There is also a substantial risk that the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority has failed to ensure
      the terms and conditions of the logging licences are being fulfilled, and has failed in its duty to
      take enforcement action.


Furthermore, as a result of the evidence relating to Giant Kingdom group logging operations in Papua
New Guinea, this report finds:
    ● There is a high risk that assets derived from Giant Kingdom group’s logging operations in Papua
      New Guinea have entered international supply chains and the international financial system.
    ● Malaysia, in particular, is a jurisdiction highly exposed to financial flows emerging from the Giant
      Kingdom group’s logging operations.


The risk alert also reviewed evidence relating to the Giant Kingdom group’s role in the acquisition of
long-term leases over customary land in Papua New Guinea. The following conclusions were reached:

    ● There is a high risk that Giant Kingdom group companies Wewak Agriculture Development
      Limited, Global Elite Limited and Continental Ventures Limited, colluded with government
      officials in the illegal acquisition of customary land.
    ● From the evidence surveyed, the long-term leases were secured without the free, prior and


      informed consent of customary landowners. The leases feature terms that are highly oppressive.
    ● There is a high risk that Giant Kingdom group companies have been funding the activity of
      officials from the Department of Lands and Physical Planning and the Royal Papua New Guinea
      Constabulary, creating serious conflicts of interest.


This risk alert also notes with concern serious allegations made by impacted landowners that police
funded by Giant Kingdom group have used violence and torture to intimidate protesting communities.

These findings are set against a broader environment of systematic malfeasance in Papua New Guinea’s
logging industry. The Bank of Papua New Guinea has stated that logging in Papua New Guinea is a high-
risk area owing to systematic evidence of illegal logging, corruption and human rights abuses. It has
stated that under the Forestry Act 1991, illegal logging is a predicate offence.

Accordingly, this risk alert recommends that businesses that have (a) regulatory obligations under anti-
money laundering provisions, and/or (b) a duty to avoid supply chains impacted by serious human
rights risks, undertake enhanced due diligence with respect to all current and future commercial
engagements with the Giant Kingdom group.

In particular it is recommended that:

    ● Entities which are regulated by AML rules rigorously establish the source of wealth and the source
      of funds of Giant Kingdom group entities. This ought to include enhanced steps that substantively
      establish that the assets, wealth or funds involved in the relationship are not, or will not, be
      derived from logging operations in Papua New Guinea, whether directly or indirectly.
    ● Regulated entities ensure when boarding and monitoring Giant Kingdom group companies that
      an enhanced level of due diligence is applied to the account on an ongoing basis.
    ● Regulated entities that have historical business dealings with Giant Kingdom group should review
      all regulated transactions and report any suspicious activity to the relevant country-level
      financial intelligence unit.
    ● Any entity commercially engaged with Giant Kingdom group companies that has a human rights
      commitment should consider deboarding this customer or client.
    ● Regulatory authorities in Malaysia and Papua New Guinea should conduct a field review of all
      regulated entities exposed to Giant Kingdom group operations, to ensure appropriate steps were
      taken when boarding and monitoring group entities given the high apparent levels of risk, which
      ought to have been apparent given the public documentation available on this conglomerate.


This report focuses on a conglomerate of associated companies in Papua New Guinea (PNG), Malaysia
and the British Virgin Islands, whose activities represent a serious risk both in Papua New Guinea and
internationally. These risks are especially significant for businesses exposed to the group that have anti-
money laundering (AML) or human rights obligations.

The primary shareholder in this group is Malaysian businessperson Ting Chiong Ming. Ting Chiong Ming
is the principal shareholder, directly or indirectly, in over 40 separate legal entities. These companies
are abbreviated in this report as the Giant Kingdom group, the overarching name by which this
conglomerate goes.

On its corporate website, Giant Kingdom group states:

        Giant Kingdom (GK) Group began its maiden venture in agro business more than a decade ago
        from The Independent State of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Thriving on the growing development
        progress of the Pacific Region, GK has since grown from a humble agro business merchant to
        become an integrated agro business enterprise with diversified interest in: Oil palm cultivation,
        palm oil milling, shipping, property development and hospitality. 4

Absent from this statement are the significant large-scale logging operations administered by group
entities in Papua New Guinea. The findings of this risk alert indicate that the group’s original source of
significant wealth was derived from large-scale tropical logging operations in Papua New Guinea. Later,
the company diversified into shipping, real estate, commodities trading, hospitality and agro-industry.

The evidence collated in this risk alert indicates that there is a substantial risk that the logging
operations in Papua New Guinea have been impacted by illegal land acquisitions from customary
owners, and subsequently, illegal logging. Furthermore, allegations have been made tying the Giant
Kingdom group to serious human rights abuses.

This has a series of serious implications for business stakeholders, which will be considered in this
report.

Following a statement on the report’s methodology, an overview will be provided in section two of Giant
Kingdom group’s corporate structure and its logging operations in Papua New Guinea. In section three,
the general risks associated with logging and money laundering in Papua New Guinea will be outlined.
Then, in sections four and five, the specific risks associated with the Giant Kingdom group’s operations
in Papua New Guinea will be identified, including evidence of illegal logging, illegal land acquisitions
and human rights violations. In the final section of this report, a series of recommendations will be
made to business and governmental stakeholders on steps that ought to be taken in response to the risks
identified.




This report has been compiled by Papua New Guinean civil society organisation Act Now!, with the
assistance both of internal staff who are leading authorities on illegal logging, and the external
assistance of Professor Kristian Lasslett, a corruption and anti-money laundering expert with 20 years’
experience in conducting complex investigations into white-collar and corporate misconduct.5

To produce this risk alert, documentary sources were collected, compiled and analysed, including:
    ● Corporate filings in Malaysia and Papua New Guinea.


    ● Legal judgements in Papua New Guinea.
    ● The Special Agriculture Business Lease Commission of Inquiry reports and transcripts.
    ● The literature on logging and oil palm in Papua New Guinea produced by government bodies,
      NGOs and academic researchers.


The research also used a number of specialist databases that feature significant volumes of data
enhanced by data-analytic tools. In particular, the risk alert utilised PNGi Portal, 6 PNGi Forests,7 Aleph8
and Seamless Horizons. 9

PNGi Portal provides access to data scraped from corporate filings in Papua New Guinea, which is
modelled to allow researchers to both identify associated companies/individuals and to identify entities
or tied entities cited in documents produced by accountability institutions in Papua New Guinea. PNGi
Forests provides access to Papua New Guinean forestry data, with modelling tools that allow researchers
to organise forestry data according to different variables, such as timber licence type, province and
logging company. Aleph and Seamless Horizons are databases that bring together a significant number
of scraped data sets globally, with data analytics in place to connect tied data.

Data collated during this investigation was triangulated and modelled using both social network
analysis and thematic analysis, drawing on analytic tools that are available on the Aleph platform. 10
Throughout this report the sources for factual statements and analytical inferences are cited. Key
primary sources are also available online as an appendix to this report, to ensure that users can
independently verify the statements made in this risk alert.

Questions generated from the research were submitted to Ting Chiong Ming and Giant Kingdom group
on 6 July 2023.11 Questions were also submitted to the PNG Forest Authority.

No reply was received to these questions.


The companies that form part of the Giant Kingdom group will now be mapped. This mapping exercise
will begin in Papua New Guinea, a region that corporate filings indicate was the original source of
significant wealth for the conglomerate. Consideration will then be given to the Malaysian operations of
the Giant Kingdom group. These companies emerged after the initiation of expansive logging operations
in Papua New Guinea. There is consequently a high likelihood that the Giant Kingdom group’s
Malaysian operations have benefited from the wealth generated in Papua New Guinea and are, as a
result, also affected by the serious risks associated with this source of wealth (see sections four and five).




The first corporate footprint identified for Ting Chiong Ming and his Giant Kingdom group are
companies incorporated in Papua New Guinea during 2008. The primary source of group wealth in
Papua New Guinea appears to derive from Giant Kingdom’s substantial logging operations. The
conglomerate has subsequently branched out into oil palm plantations, shipping, real estate and
financial intermediation. The Papua New Guinean registered companies through which these lines of
business are conducted can be viewed in Table 1 and Figure 1.


It appears that from approximately 2015, holding companies for the Giant Kingdom group operations in
Papua New Guinea are primarily Malaysia based. However, prior to that, part of Ting Chiong Ming’s
interests in Papua New Guinean corporate entities were held through registered holding companies in
the British Virgin Islands. Drawing on data revealed by the Panama and Paradise Papers leaks, Ting
Chiong Ming’s British Virgin Island interests are set out in Table 2.




Based on the data surveyed in this risk assessment, which includes both corporate filings and
information divulged as part of a Commission of Inquiry into Special Agricultural and Business Leases,
the initial principal source of wealth for the Giant Kingdom group appears to be logging.

Two of the Giant Kingdom group’s principal Papua New Guinean timber companies are Global Elite
Limited and Summit Agriculture Limited. The forestry data available on their Papua New Guinea logging
operations are presented in tables three and four.


The corporate data indicates that following Giant Kingdom group’s expansion in large-scale logging and
then subsequently palm oil, the income from these enterprises have been diversified into a number of
different business lines. Giant Kingdom and its subsidiaries are now involved in shipping, commodity
trading, hotels and resorts, industrial equipment, and property development. A significant part of these
diversified operations takes place in and through Malaysian incorporated entities.




From approximately 2015, the principal corporate seat of the Giant Kingdom group appears to have
moved from the British Virgin Islands to Malaysia. Currently, the conglomerate’s ultimate parent
company is Giant Kingdom Holdings Sdn Bhd. Its shares are wholly owned by Ting Chiong Ming. 50 The
Malaysian subsidiaries of Giant Kingdom Holdings, its line of business and total stated assets is set out
in table five along with its revenue for 2021.


Additionally, corporate filings in Malaysia also show that Ting Chiong Ming is the ultimate owner of
Labuan registered entities, GK Green Limited 67 and GK Pacific Limited.68 Labuan is a domestic secrecy
jurisdiction and tax haven in Malaysia.

It will be observed that overall Giant Kingdom group’s Malaysian operations are implemented through
companies that were incorporated primarily in the period 2014–2015. There is a significant possibility
that the wealth generated from its prior operations in Papua New Guinea has contributed financially,
directly or indirectly, to the notable growth in Giant Kingdom’s Malaysian-based asset holding.

The risks associated with this wealth generated in Papua New Guinea will be elaborated on in sections
four and five.


This section examines the general risks associated with logging in Papua New Guinea. It then sets out
the legal regime governing the management of Papua New Guinea’s forests, before considering the
particular risks posed by logging operations conducted under Forest Clearance Authorities. These risks
have particular relevance to section four, where consideration is given to the logging operations of Giant
Kingdom.




Forest management in Papua New Guinea over the past four decades has been characterised by
widespread illegal and unsustainable logging, which makes it a high-risk sector from an anti-money
laundering (AML) and human rights due diligence perspective.

For example, an AML risk assessment published by the Bank of Papua New Guinea in 2017 identifies the
logging sector as ‘high risk’ where ‘illegal activities ... generate large amounts of illegal profits’.69 The
Bank of Papua New Guinea notes that estimates have placed the value of illegal logging in Papua New
Guinea at ‘between 70 and 90 percent of the total product exported’. 70

The risk this poses to regulated entities is underlined by the Bank, which observes:

      The legislation governing logging and other forest industry activities is the Forestry Act 1991 ...
      Any logging activity which is conducted without or contrary to lawful authority under the Act is
      illegal and can constitute an offence under s.122 of the Act. Section 122 of the Act provides for
      breaches and penalties under the Act. It is an offence to engage in forestry activities outside of
      those allowed by a timber permit, a timber authority, or license. This offence carries a penalty fine
      of K1,000,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or both. There is a default
      penalty of a fine not exceeding K10,000. The offence therefore is a predicate for money laundering
      and for recovery of criminal assets under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2005.71 [Italics added]

The Bank of Papua New Guinea warns that regulated entities situated abroad are particularly exposed to
criminal assets generated from illegal logging in Papua New Guinea. It notes: ‘Illegal logging and fishing
are the two forms of environmental crimes which are believed to produce the largest amount of criminal
proceeds. However, unlike the proceeds of most crime in PNG, the proceeds of illegal logging and
fishing accrue in other countries.’72

The Bank of Papua New Guinea’s assessment coheres with broader findings published by civil society
organisations. An earlier 2011 Forest Governance Integrity Baseline Report, produced by Transparency
International Papua New Guinea, found there was a ‘high risk’ of corruption throughout the forest
management process.73

This extended from undue influence and state capture in the amendment of forestry laws, through to
bribery and collusion in both the acquisition of forest management rights from customary landowners
and the award of logging permits; lack of monitoring of logging operations and their environmental
impacts; undervaluing and underreporting of log exports to evade taxes; destruction and contamination
of food and water sources due to lack of compliance with environmental laws; and, the unfair
distribution of royalties due to landowners.

These findings were echoed in subsequent research. A 2014 review of the logging industry in Papua New
Guinea published by the independent policy institute, Chatham House, concludes:


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In a 2020 update based on new empirical research, Chatham House concludes that Papua New Guinea
had ‘made little progress in addressing illegal logging’ since its earlier assessment and ‘regulatory
mechanisms are weak and there remains a lack of transparency in forest resource allocation and
widespread corruption’.74

In 2016 and 2018, the Oakland Institute think tank in the United States published detailed reports on
logging companies operating in Papua New Guinea suggesting that they engaged in illegal logging, tax
evasion and financial misreporting, costing the country more than US$100 million in lost revenues. 75
These findings have been endorsed by Papua New Guinea’s Internal Revenue Commission (IRC). In 2021,
the IRC announced a crackdown on the logging industry, accusing it of being ‘one of the most
delinquent sectors insofar as tax compliance is concerned’, and guilty of ‘egregious’ transfer pricing,
‘entrenched’ tax evasion, and ‘deceptive behaviour’. 76 In June 2023, the IRC announced it was charging
an unnamed logging company K140 million for unlawful tax evasion and transfer pricing. 77

A 2017 Timber Legality Risk Assessment for Papua New Guinea identified multiple risks of illegality in
every one of the 17 categories evaluated, including, for example, failure to obtain the free, prior and
informed consent of customary land owners, bribery in the issuance of permits and licences, failure to
monitor compliance with harvesting rules, tax evasion through trade mis-invoicing, labour violations
including use of illegal migrant workers and forced labour, and failure to follow CITES-implementing
legislation.78

This consistent pattern of findings was further verified in a study published in 2018 by Global Witness. 79
The report documents systemic instances of illegalities in the allocation and operation of different types
of logging and forest clearance projects. In some cases, all of the operations examined, by project type,
were apparently operating illegally.

Finally, a Timber Legality Risk Assessment published by Forest Trends in September 2021 ranks Papua
New Guinea in the highest risk category for illegal timber. The risk was assessed against 21 areas of law
relevant to timber production and national governance. The assessment notes ‘there are reportedly
serious governance and corruption challenges highly relevant to the forestry sector. Multiple official
inquiries and independent studies have documented widespread corruption and failure to enforce
laws.’80 The assessment notes: ‘All tropical hardwood exports should be considered high-risk based on
overall legality risk in PNG.’

It can be reliably concluded on the basis of these studies that logging in Papua New Guinea is a high-risk
economic sector, impacted systemically and systematically by criminal activity including illegal logging,
bribery and tax evasion. The data pertaining to these risks is widely available in open access forms, for
example, through the above reports, online legal judgements and official forest inquiry reports that are
also available online.


There are three types of forest harvesting licence allowed under the Forestry Act 1991:81 the Forest
Management Agreement, the Forest Clearance Authority and the Timber Authority.

Each type of licence is designed for a specific purpose.

A Timber Authority is used to authorise small-scale harvesting activities.82 This is defined as the cutting
of less than 5,000 cubic metres of timber for domestic processing, the removal of up to 50 hectares of
forest for agriculture or other land use change, the clearing of a roadline not exceeding 12.5 km in
length, or harvesting non-timber forest products or a timber plantation.

A Forest Management Agreement is a contract between customary landowners and the Papua New
Guinea Forest Authority (PNGFA) for the sustainable management of large areas of forest and selective
timber harvesting.83 Under the contract, the PNGFA acquires the long-term rights to manage the forest.
The PNGFA is then able to select a logging company to sustainably harvest timber and issue them with a
timber permit.

Under a properly managed Forest Management Agreement, the logging company will select, cut and
remove individual trees, leaving the surrounding forest intact to continue its growth.

This is very different from an operation under the third type of licence, the Forest Clearance Authority
(FCA). A FCA is designed to allow the large-scale conversion of forest to agriculture or other land uses. 84
The Forestry Act 1991 makes it clear that an FCA can only be granted ‘for the purpose of clearance of
natural forest on areas designated for agriculture or other land use development’. 85

The key word, ‘clearance’, is not further defined in the Act, so carries its ordinary dictionary meaning.
The Oxford English Dictionary is a classic reference work used by the courts. It defines clearance as ‘the
process of removing things that are not wanted’.

Similarly, the Collins English Dictionary, also frequently cited by judges, says ‘clearance’ means
‘the removal of old buildings, trees, or other things that are not wanted from an area’.

The Forestry Act also specifically requires that ‘in order to ensure that the agriculture actually takes
place, any Forest Clearance Authority shall provide that any forest clearing operation shall be
authorised in four phases’.86 Each phase ‘shall represent approximately one quarter of the total area to
be cleared’ and ‘shall be subdivided into blocks for clearing of a maximum of 500 hectares’.

The Act then specifies that permission for logging under a second or any subsequent phase ‘may only be
granted’ where ‘all conditions relating to the development plan and implementation schedule have been
satisfied’.87

Rights under a Forest Clearance Authority may be suspended ‘where the planned land use for which a
forest clearance authority is granted is not progressing according to the development plan or
implementation schedule’, or any condition of the FCA is breached.88




The FCA is one particular licence type and is at particular risk of abuse. There is systematic evidence
demonstrating that FCAs are routinely abused in Papua New Guinea to allow large-scale logging


operations over large areas of forest, in breach of the Forestry Act 1991 and the rules designed to ensure
sustainable management.

For example, Papua New Guinea Forest Authority staff at a planning retreat in 2017 identified FCA
management and agriculture clearances as a key priority area. It was noted that ‘existing procedures are
not being fully implemented due to developers bypassing elements of the process and political pressure
for developments to go ahead’.89 The workshop made a number of key recommendations for the future
management of FCAs including ‘develop only 500ha blocks at a time’ and the cancellation of ‘non-
compliant’ FCAs.

A 2019 National Forestry Summit, again organised by the PNGFA, identified further concerns associated
with FCAs, including ‘land obtained without consent’, ‘theft of forest resources’, ‘poor to zero benefit
sharing’, ‘non-compliance to Legislation and Policies’ and ‘lack of monitoring and enforcement’. 90

Supporting these assessments, a Global Witness report published in 2018 describes the systematic
violation of land rights associated with FCAs. The report also details evidence from field investigations
that shows FCAs were not being used to convert forest into agriculture projects. Rather, they were being
employed to facilitate extensive logging operations. The evidence collected, Global Witness observes,
‘strongly suggests these permits were obtained fraudulently’. Global Witness also documents
‘concerning signs that due process has been violated when issuing recent FCAs’. 91

In December 2022, the National Forest Board responded to the above concerns by imposing a 12-month
moratorium on the issuing of new FCA permits and it ordered an ‘audit’ of existing FCA operations. 92

This moratorium has not impacted the existing and ongoing operations of Summit Agriculture and
Global Elite Limited, documented in the next section.


This section will survey some of the key risks present in Giant Kingdom group logging operations in
Papua New Guinea. It will begin by considering the size of the Forest Clearance Authority concessions
issued to group companies, which appear to far outstrip any agricultural purpose. This issue will then be
examined in more detail by focusing on specific evidence related to the Wewak Turubu and Wammy
areas.




It was noted in section three that a FCA is only supposed to be used to authorise the clearing of trees
from an area of forest that is being converted into agriculture use or other land use development. The
FCAs issued to the Giant Kingdom group companies, Summit Agriculture Limited and Global Elite
Limited, for the Wewak Turubu and Wammy areas are reported to cover an area of 121,000 and 105,000
hectares, respectively.93

To place this in perspective, New Britain Palm Oil Limited (NBPOL), the largest oil palm producer in the
Pacific region and the largest private sector employer in Papua New Guinea, operates oil palm
plantations in five different provinces of Papua New Guinea and in the Solomon Islands. The total size of
NBPOL’s oil palm estate, across six provinces, is just 90,000 ha. 94 That is 136,000 hectares less than the
combined size of the two FCAs issued to Summit Agriculture and Global Elite.

To further underline the point, West New Britain Province is regarded as the ‘oil palm capital’ of Papua
New Guinea. It has the largest and oldest oil palm estates anywhere in the country and is the
headquarters for New Britain Palm Oil Limited. The total area of the oil palm estate in West New Britain
is just 38,000 hectares.95 This is considerably less than half the size of either of the FCAs granted to
Summit Agriculture and Global Elite, ostensibly for agriculture or other land use development.

In light of these asymmetries there is a clear possibility that neither Summit Agriculture or Global Elite
intends to clear over 100,000 hectares of forest each to plant oil palm or other agricultural crops.
Instead, there is a substantive risk these companies are carrying out selective logging operations,
cutting tracks across the forest to access, fell and remove the largest and most valuable trees, without
completing large-scale forest clearance and agricultural planting over the FCA areas.

This scenario seems to be borne out by further empirical evidence detailed below in sections 4.2 and 4.3.




In September 2008, a Special Agriculture Business Lease covering 116,840 hectares of land known as
Portion 144C in East Sepik Province was issued to Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited for oil palm
development.

Sepik Oil Palm Plantation, a company registered in Papua New Guinea, is 80% owned by another PNG
company, Wewak Agriculture Development Limited (see Table 1). Wewak Agriculture Development is a
subsidiary of GK Agriculture Sdn Bhd of Malaysia, which is, in turn, owned by Giant Kingdom Holdings
Bhd.

Six months after the Special Agriculture Business Lease was granted, in March 2009, a FCA was issued
by the PNGFA to Wewak Agriculture Development for the ‘Wewak-Turubu Integrated Agroforestry
Project’.

Although the FCA supposedly covers the same land portion as the Special Agriculture Business Lease, it
is slightly larger in area, covering some 121,000ha. 96


Wewak Agriculture Development began log exports under the FCA in 2010, but in 2011 transferred
responsibility for the logging operation to Summit Agriculture Limited. According to satellite analysis
conducted by Global Witness, by December 2015 an estimated 507 km 2 (50,700 hectares) of forest had
been selectively logged while less than 2 km 2 (200 ha) had been cleared for agriculture. 97




Global Witness also identified substantial logging that was taking place outside the FCA boundary. By
December 2015, according to Global Witness, some 227 km2 of forest had been logged outside the
concession boundary.98

More recently, an April 2023 report published by the Earthqualizer Foundation recorded that the 8,090
hectares of oil palm planting in Wewak-Turubu is ‘no deforestation’ compliant, as ‘the oil palm is almost
exclusively planted on grasslands’. 99 The report states that its findings are based on extensive satellite
imagery analysis, to identify and verify all vegetation changes over the period 2016–2022. This again
indicates that the logging operations in Wewak Turubu have not been conducted in order to clear forest
land for agricultural activity.

The issue of the type of logging operation being conducted in Wewak Turubu was also raised in a
Commission of Inquiry conducted into the use of Special Agriculture Business Leases, which reported in
August 2013.

In regard to Wewak Turubu, the Commission of Inquiry reported that there was a disparity between the
logging and the progress of the planned oil palm planting. The Commission observed: ‘The Oil Palm


planting program is developing at a very slow rate without management expertise and accommodation
for housing the staff.’100

Evidence presented to the inquiry by Wewak Agriculture Development itself, the Commission states,
suggested that oil palm planting would be done in areas that were previously grassland and not in
cleared areas of the forest. The Commission noted: ‘Clearly there was evidence of clearance of forest and
logging of merchantable timber. We also met the employed Forester for the company, a Papua New
Guinean national who confirmed that they were undertaking selective logging within the SABL project
site.’101

In addition, the Commission found that at the time of a 2012 site visit by a Commissioner – four years
after the lease had been granted and three years since the FCA was issued – while an oil palm nursery
had recently been established in a grassland area, there was no other agricultural infrastructure in
place.

The Commission of Inquiry also raised additional environmental concerns over the associated wharf
facilities, noting: ‘The logging wharf at Forok (Cape Turubu) was also a makeshift wharf built on logs
and soil. There was ominous signs of environmental damage to the sago and mangrove palms along the
seashore, part of the mountain cut to extract stones and soil was subject to erosion and created very
serious environmental concerns. There was no strict adherence and policing done by DEC [Department
of Environment and Conversation] on the environmental damage to the coastline where the logging
wharf was erected.’102

Once triangulated, this evidence points to a substantial risk that the logging operation being conducted
by Summit Agriculture under its FCA is not a forest clearance for agriculture but instead is a large-scale
selective logging operation. There is also a risk that a proportion of the logs harvested have come from
forest areas outside the licence boundary.

According to the Bank of Papua New Guinea, if this is in fact the case, it would potentially constitute a
predicate crime under the Forestry Act, which has important implications for third parties providing
regulated services to the Giant Kingdom group. 103




Global Elite Limited’s logging operations in the Wammy area of West Sepik Province are being carried
out under a Forest Clearance Authority issued by the PNG Forest Authority. The FCA was issued in 2013
and the first log exports were recorded in 2015. 104

According to an ABC television documentary broadcast on 9 March 2023, Global Elite accepts that it has
not planted any agricultural crops. 105 The company alleges that this is because landowners burnt down
its oil palm and rubber nurseries.

A scientific analysis published in 2014 states the Environmental Inception Report and Environmental
Impact Statement submitted to the PNG Department of Environment and Conservation for the Wammy
agriculture project indicated an area of 60,000 hectares was to be planted with oil palm.106 The analysis
found the area contains insufficient suitable land to sustain an economically viable palm oil production
project, which was estimated in the report to be 5,000–10,000 hectares.107

Recent analysis of satellite imagery for the area covered by the FCA suggests there has been widespread
selective logging and almost no forest clearance.


The analysis shows only one very small area of forest, approximately 240 hectares, cleared for potential
agricultural planting.

Below is a satellite photograph showing a close-up of the forest clearance:




There is also no evidence that the PNGFA has taken steps to enforce its rights to suspend the FCA ‘where
the planned land use for which a forest clearance authority is granted is not progressing according to the
development plan or implementation schedule’ or any condition of the FCA is breached.108

This evidence, therefore, indicates that there is substantial risk that Global Elite Limited is undertaking
an illegal logging operation, with the complicity – whether by commission or omission – of the PNGFA.
This logging operation has been ongoing for eight years and has generated more than US$40 million in
revenue for Global Elite from log sales.109


The ABC television documentary cited above also presents evidence of violence against and physical
intimidation of local landowners by police officers allegedly brought in by Global Elite Limited, which
pays for their food and accommodation.110

These are allegations that the ABC states Global Elite has denied.

One landowner, Luke Amial, was interviewed on camera for the film. He states that he never gave
consent on behalf of his clan for the logging operation. Another landowner, a land group chairman,
states somebody else signed a logging consent on his behalf.

But when landowners try to complain, they claim, the company uses police officers to intimidate them
with violence and guns.

‘They [police] broke my jaw, my teeth, my mouth. They beat me badly,’ attests Luke Amial. 111

Luke Amial and others also report being locked in shipping containers by police for days at a time to
deter them from protesting.

In one incident, described on camera, the landowners state police shot into a crowd, killing one man
and paralysing another. The police officer was then killed by the crowd in retaliation.

In support of these claims, the ABC states that it has seen a confidential PNG Defence Force report that
confirms ‘logging companies [are] using police to bulldoze over the rights of landowners’.


Landowners are also seen in the film complaining that while the logging company has committed to
improving schools/health facilities and building new roads, they have not seen any benefits to date.




Although much smaller in scale than either the Wewak Turubu or Wammy logging operations, the Giant
Kingdom group company Summit Agriculture Limited, majority owned by Ting Chiong Ming, is listed as
the logging company in at least nine other logging projects that have exported logs between 2015–
2022.112

Six of these were small road construction projects licensed under a Timber Authority (TA). Such projects
are limited to clearing timber from an area not greater than 12.5 km long and 40 m wide in order to create
a new road. Although the Forestry Act 1991 does not quantify the volume of timber that can be legally
harvested under this type of Timber Authority, calculations of the amount of timber that can be
harvested from Papua New Guinea forests suggest an absolute upper maximum of 211 m 3/ha. This means
that the maximum amount of timber that can possibly be harvested from a 50-ha TA is 10,550 m3.113

Yet in 2017 Summit Agriculture Limited exported 19,101 m3 from a single road construction project in
East Sepik Province, licensed as TA 11-36 Niagram. When asked by Global Witness to explain this
apparent contradiction, the PNG Forest Authority reportedly replied saying it does not monitor Timber
Authority operations in the field because of their small size and that the area of the TA could not be
verified.114

This is despite the fact that applications for a Timber Authority should include maps of the proposed
area and that the PNGFA is obliged to control all logging operations. 115


The previous section assessed risks associated with Giant Kingdom’s Papua New Guinea-based logging
operations. In this section, consideration will be given to other risks associated with the operations of
Giant Kingdom group companies. These include complicity in the grabbing of customary land and audit
concerns over financial statements.




          “
Findings produced by the Special Agriculture and Business Lease (SABL) Commission of Inquiry, and
court judgements, indicate that companies in which Ting Chiong Ming is a shareholder and that appear
to be part of his conglomerate Giant Kingdom group, acquired long-term leases on over 300,000 hectares
of customary land – leases that were acquired from landowners illegally.

Under Papua New Guinean legislation, customary land acquisition is conducted by the government to
ensure that full and informed consent is given by customary landowners. However, evidence presented
in the SABL Commission of Inquiry suggests that Giant Kingdom group logging and agricultural
companies were directly involved in illegal acquisition processes overseen by government officials. This
includes paying for Lands Department officials’ travel, working with such officials to expedite processes,
and allegedly applying pressure to landowners to consent to land acquisitions.

The evidence acquired by the Commission of Inquiry also points to agricultural operations – specifically,
palm oil and rubber tree projects – that were poorly planned, with the principal apparent focus being on
logging the large tracts of land over which these leases were issued.

Both the Commission of Inquiry and courts found that the agreement between the developer companies
and companies set up by select landowners were oppressive and involved surrendering all customary
and traditional rights over the land for the duration of the leases.

The report will now document the three leases that Ting Chiong Ming companies acquired and the
criticisms made of them in subsequent inquiries and court cases.




In section 4.2, it was noted that a SABL over 116,840 hectares of land contained in Portion 144C was
issued to the company Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited. This lease was ostensibly to facilitate the
Wewak-Turubu Large Scale Integrated Agriculture Project in East Sepik.

Shares in Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited, it will be recalled, have been held 80% by Wewak
Agricultural Development Limited and 20% by Limawo Holdings Limited (see Table 1). During the land
acquisition period, the shares in Limawo Holdings Limited were held by six individuals from the
affected area in Wewak-Turubu. Wewak Agricultural Development shares have been held by Ting
Chiong Ming (90%) (2008–2010),116 WADL Investments Limited (100%) (2010–2015)117 and GK Agriculture
Sdn Bhd118 (100%) (2015–current). Through the international verification process set out in Tables 1, 2
and 5 regarding WADL Investments119 and GK Agriculture Sdn Bhd,120 Ting Chiong Ming appears from


corporate filings to be the primary owner of Wewak Agricultural Development Limited.

Concerns over the logging operations that have taken place in and around the land contained within the
SABL lease over Portion 144C have already been noted in section 4.2. Statements issued by the
Commission of Inquiry,121 the National Court122 of Papua New Guinea and the Supreme Court 123 of Papua
New Guinea raise additional concerns over how the affected land was initially acquired from customary
landowners.

Both the Courts and Commission of Inquiry have concluded that the rights to the land over which the
SABL was subsequently issued to Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited were acquired illegally by the
Government of Papua New Guinea for the benefit of Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited, in what the
Commission described as a collusive relationship. 124 This acquisition was made, the National and
Supreme Courts have concluded, under oppressive terms, without the consent of customary landowners
and without meaningful consultation with the impacted community regarding the long-term impacts of
the project and lease on their rights, livelihoods and culture.

These conclusions must be set against the special protections afforded to customary land in Papua New
Guinea, given its integral role in community life. It is estimated that 97% of land in Papua New Guinea is
customarily owned.125 In practice, this means that land is owned communally by kinship groups that
administer the real property though local tenure systems that grant usufructuary rights to its members.

A strong emphasis is placed both in local tenure systems and in the Constitution of Papua New Guinea
on conserving customary land in a responsible manner for the benefit of future generations. The
National Goals and Directive Principles, which are enumerated in the preamble of Papua New Guinea’s
Constitution, state: ‘We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea’s natural resources and
environment to be conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all, and be replenished for the
benefit of future generations.’126

Accordingly, under Papua New Guinea law, customary land cannot be alienated directly to private
developers. However, under the Land Act 1996, the state has been able to acquire customary land and
issue what is known as Special Agricultural and Business Leases to third parties. 127 This can only occur
following a thorough process of public consultation by the government, which ensures all landowners
provide substantive consent to the proposal and understand its implications for their rights going
forward. These steps are required, the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea has observed, ‘to ensure that
customary landowners whose title is, after all, usually collective, rather than individual, are protected
from the loss of their interest in the land whether it be a result of the actions of exploitative outsiders or
fraudulent or self-interested co-owners’.128 This statement points to the documented risk in Papua New
Guinea where land is a systematic target of fraudulent and corrupt conduct, designed to acquire
valuable real estate at a discounted price.129

Set against this backdrop, and as a result of these legal provisions, before land could be leased to Sepik
Oil Palm Plantation Company for the proposed Wewak-Turubu Large Scale Integrated Agriculture
Project, it was incumbent upon the state to engage in a meaningful and in-depth process of consultation
with affected landowners. This consultation must ensure that impacted communities have a precise
understanding of what is proposed by Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited and what the impacts will be.
This thorough-going process must also assure free prior informed consent is given to the acquisition by
all landowners.

The Commission of Inquiry and the courts both reached the conclusion that the acquisition of the land
by the state and the granting of the SABL to Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited was done in an expedited
manner that did not facilitate meaningful consultation or the acquisition of landowner consent.
Furthermore, the Commission of Inquiry concluded that there was specific evidence of ‘collusion’
between Sepik Oil Palm Plantation and government officials, 130 which prompted the expedited approach
to customary land acquisition and the granting of an SABL.


The haste with which the consultation process was undertaken, the Commission of Inquiry observes, is
indicated in a Land Investigation Report produced by Peter Yapog from the Lands Department. Yapog’s
report states: ‘Since this project has taken almost 11 years to come to fruition, it is hereby recommended
that the application for lease-lease back be fast trekked (sic) to enable the investor-developer to
commence development.’131

The Commission found that this Department of Lands and Physical Planning’s ‘Land Investigation
Report was flawed because it failed to ascertain the majority consent of the whole land groups within
Turubu inland, Turubu coastal, Sausso, and Tring’. 132 Furthermore, the Commission found: ‘The
objections raised by the majority of landowners indicate that the line agencies linked to SABL process
have not coordinated well enough to educate the villagers on SABL and its impact on their customary
land and development prospects for the landowners.’ 133 As a result, the Commission Inquiry
recommended that the SABL be revoked. 134

With regard to Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited (SOPPL) the Commission found: ‘SOPPL does not have
the managerial, nor the capacity to undertake large scale agriculture activity and is a logging company.
The lack of infrastructure at the Nursery and Oil Palm Estate indicates that SOPPL lacks capacity both
financially and experience in the agriculture sector. The soil is not suitable for oil palm estate.’ 135

Echoing the Commission’s findings in 2014, Oxfam Australia published a report that raised ‘serious
concerns’ about the SABL granted to Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited over the Turubu land area and
questioned ‘the legality of the lease and the validity of the logging’.136 The report contains details of
interviews conducted with people in six villages in the Turubu area.

Issues raised by the communities included not giving their free, prior informed consent to the
agriculture lease, and not having been given crucial information including that logging would be
involved, the total land area impacted, and the length of the lease. They also reported negative
environmental impacts from the logging including damage to the forest, water pollution, loss of cash
crops and desecration of sacred sites, and a lack of financial or other benefits and an increase in
community conflict.

In the same year as the Oxfam report, impacted landowner communities initiated civil action to cancel
the SABL issued to Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited. The National Court concluded that landowner
consent had not been obtained. The court also concluded that there had been a lack of consultation by
the government when explaining to landowners the impacts of the lease and associated project on
customary rights.137 Justice Gavara-Nanu observed consultation involved a 50-minute meeting held on 25
July 2008, at Turumu Primary School:

      I am also not satisfied that the meeting held at Turumu Primary School on 25 July, 2008,
      met the requirements of meaningful consultation with the landowners. The first thing to
      note is that the meeting lasted for only 50 minutes. That very clearly was insufficient time
      to gauge the landowners’ views on SABL. Furthermore, only 18 people spoke in the
      meeting. That meeting was the only one held. 138

Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited appealed the National Court decision. The Supreme Court of Papua
New Guinea upheld the National Court decision and took the opportunity to emphasise the oppressive
nature of the agreement that had been signed between the government and a small number of
landowners.139 Justices Lenalia, Higgins and Kangwia observed: ‘The form of Lease issued (AB302) is
itself extraordinary. It alienates the land for 99 years and contains no reservation of the customary rights
of the traditional inhabitants of the Land. The form of consent/undertaking referred to in the lease is, in
itself, an extraordinary document’. 140

The letter of consent/undertaking is reproduced in Table 7.


“


Justices Lenalia, Higgins and Kangwia also remarked: ‘The terms of the Lease and of the
consent/undertaking allegedly given on behalf of the landowners are so oppressive that it calls into
question whether the customary owners could have understood the arrangement they were being asked
to agree to, if indeed they were asked.’141

The letter of consent, it should also be noted, attests that the developer, Giant Kingdom group company
Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited, was directly involved in the land acquisition process, including it
appears by funding certain landowner groups and the land investigation process. The letter specifically
acknowledges that the developer ‘has expanded [sic] money already in mobilizing landowners,
conducting awareness, financing surveys and the Land Investigations, documenting the formation of
Land groups, etc’.142 This directly speaks to the claim made by the SABL Commission of Inquiry that the
illegal lease had been developed through a collusive relationship between the developer Sepik Oil Palm
Plantation Limited and government officials, with the former appearing to be the principal beneficiary of
the oppressive outcome for customary landowners.

Despite the decisions of the National and Supreme Court, the logging under the FCA has continued. 143
The original landowner partners of Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited allege that Wewak Agriculture
simply logged the timber and then left, with no intention of processing palm oil. 144




A second company owned in part by Ting Chiong Ming benefited from an illegally issued SABL lease,
according to the Commission of Inquiry.

This SABL lease is for 99 years and covers 105,200ha of customary land situated within Portion 27C in
West Sepik Province. The land was earmarked for a ‘logging, log marketing and commercial agriculture’
operation between a landowner company, Wammy Limited, and the foreign investor, Global Elite
Limited.145 The project was known as the Wammy Rural Development Project. It appears from the
Commission’s findings that the project initially involved large-scale logging, the revenues from which
would then be used to establish an oil palm plantation.

Daniel Waranduo, the provincial lands officer of Sandaun Province, confirmed in his evidence to the
Commission that ‘about 6–12 Incorporated Land Groups (ILGs) withheld their consent for Wammy
Limited and Global Elite Limited to be the vehicles of development’.146

Nevertheless, the 99-year SABL over Land Portion 27C was initially granted to Wammy Limited on 8
October 2010, by the Lands Secretary in his capacity as ministerial delegate.

Wammy Limited was incorporated on 7 April 2010 with four shareholders, and 18 directors, all Papua
New Guinean. It is ostensibly a ‘landowner company’ formed to represent local landowners and engage
in commercial activities on their behalf. The Commission concluded that Wammy Limited only
represented five out of 22 villages within the affected land area. 147 The issued lease ‘was not on the basis
of popular landowner wish to lease their land’, which is an essential prerequisite under the Land Act
1996.148

The Commission also noted flaws in the Lands Department due diligence process. It reportedly failed to
recognise contention within the community, with the Commission observing: ‘The Land Investigation
Process (LIP) was not properly executed and the Land Investigation Report (LIR) was badly done.’ 149

Prior to its conversion into leasehold land, the entire area was customary land. According to the
Commission, the lease ‘made no reservations for any traditional landowner rights and has not allowed
for any residual rights to be enjoyed by the landowners during the period of the lease’. 150 This, says the
Commission of Inquiry, was ‘a reckless failure’. 151


A Project Development Agreement was signed between Global Elite and Wammy Limited for ‘logging,
log marketing and commercial agriculture’ on 15 April 2010. A sublease for 60 years over the entire
Portion 27C was then granted to Global Elite Limited on 18 October 2010.152 It was approved by the
Department of Lands and Physical Planning and registered on 29 October 2010.

The Commission formed a dim view of Global Elite and its business model for the ‘agricultural’ project.
The Commission observed: ‘Whilst Global Elite Limited has Forest Industry Participant Certification, it
conspicuously lacks IPA authority to engage in Agriculture activities. The company’s representative, Mr.
Albert Lau, insisted at the Vanimo hearings that the developer will secure the certification when it needs
to, presumably when it is ready to plant oil palm or rubber trees or whatever it needs to plant, and that
again presumably after it has logged out sufficient areas for the purpose and more importantly, after it
had made enough money to “recoup its costs” and also “additional money to fund the costs of the
agriculture component”.’153

The Commission continues: ‘This indicates that the developer is not bringing into the country its own
resources and capital to invest in the country and instead is trying to raise money in-country through
logging activities before it ventures out into agriculture and other business activities. This is contrary to
the National Government’s policy on foreign investment to boost the local economy by bringing in
foreign exchange.’154 However, the Commission did concede that the ‘developer’s interest appears
genuine’.155

The Agriculture and Rural Development Project Proposal for oil palm and rubber was submitted by
Global Elite Limited and then approved by the Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL) by letter
dated 27 September 2010. According to the Commission, ‘the Land Development Plan submitted by the
developer shows that only 40% of the land will be utilized for agriculture activities’.156

The Department of Agriculture approval was given prior to a public hearing that was scheduled for
November 2010. It actually took place three months later, on 5 February 2011.

The Environmental Inception Report and Environmental Impact Statement was approved in principle by
the Department of Environment (DEC) in a letter from the minister dated 20 July 2011.

According to the Commission: ‘DAL and DEC approvals and permits appear to have been granted
without any independent assessment on the impact of ongoing, visible substantial landowner
disagreements and opposition to both Wammy Limited and Global Elite Limited.’157

At the time of the Commission of Inquiry hearings, 2011–2013, there was no FCA yet issued.

The Commission reached a number of negative findings including:
    ● There was a lack of informed consent by customary landowners to the SABL granted to Wammy
      Limited and subleased to Global Elite.
    ● Wammy Limited only represented five villages (as indicated in its name, which is an acronym for
      Wagou, Aiendami, Mandopai, Mokedami and Yuwari) out of 22 villages located within the SABL
      boundary.
    ● There was ‘what clearly appears to be polarized, irreconcilable positions between the two
      contending landowner groups’ over the grant of the SABL and the engagement of Global Elite. 158
    ● The Land Investigation Report failed to record that there were 6–12 Incorporated Land Groups
      that did not consent to their land being leased to Wammy and Global Elite. It was noted ‘The Land
      Investigation Process (LIP) was not properly executed and the Land Investigation Report (LIR)
      was badly done. Even though some landowners appear to have been consulted and their
      signatures collected, the genuineness of the LIR is in doubt in the light of the allegations of fraud
      raised by the opposing group.’159


    ● The ‘Boundaries Walk/Inspection did not happen’ despite being ‘a pivotal activity’. 160
    ● This ‘conscious dissent and opposition’ was not recorded in the Land Inspection Report, and a
      Certificate of Alienability was duly issued by the Provincial Administrator. 161
    ● The ‘failure of the Provincial Administrator and the Lands Officers who advised him possibly
      borders on criminal negligence’.162


The Commission of Inquiry thus recommended that the SABL be surrendered and re-negotiated to
ensure that the two different factions of landowners be properly recognised, so that each could pursue
their own development aspirations.

Despite these unequivocal findings of the Commission that Wammy Limited did not represent all the
landowners of Portion 27C and a majority were not in favour of the engagement of Global Elite Limited, it
appears the PNGFA went ahead and granted a FCA to Global Elite Limited in 2013. 163




Portion 16C covers 112,400 hectares of customary land north-west of Madang. It was leased through a
SABL to a purported landowner company, Urasir Resources Limited, on 14 March 2011. 164 The land was
then subleased to Continental Ventures Limited (CVL), in order to set up a logging and agricultural
project named the Urasirk Development Project.

Continental Venture Limited was registered in Papua New Guinea in August 2010. Giant Kingdom
International Limited was the sole shareholder. 165 Since August 2015, Continental Venture has been
jointly owned by Ting Chiong Ming and Ying Sing Tan (see Table 1). 166

Referencing the Agricultural Development Plan for Urasirk Development Project, the SABL Commission
of Inquiry notes that the operation involved an application for a FCA, the conversion of logged-over and
cleared areas into agricultural plantations, the establishment of nuclear-type oil palm and rubber
plantations mixed with other suitable crops, with Continental Venture Limited being the project
developer and Urasir Resources Limited acting as the landowner company. 167

It was estimated that 91,830 hectares from the land plot was productive forested areas, with 94,400
hectares available for planting. 75,520 hectares would be used for oil palm and 18,580 would be set aside
for rubber trees.168 In section 4.1, it was noted that New Britain Palm Oil Limited (NBPOL), the largest oil
palm producer in the Pacific region and the largest private sector employer in Papua New Guinea,
operates oil palm plantations in five different provinces of Papua New Guinea and in the Solomon
Islands. The total size of NBPOL’s oil palm estate, across six provinces, is 90,000 ha.169 This suggests that
the proposed size of the Urasirk Development Project was notably unrealistic.

The Commission also raised concerns over the professionalism with which the agricultural plan for this
proposed project had been produced by Continental Venture Limited. It observed: ‘Mr Emeterio Lujero
[is] consultant and employee of DD Lumber Limited. According to Mr Lujero, DD Lumber is a Malaysian
Company, a company that is linked to project sites in the Central Province. Mr Lujero was summonsed
and gave evidence at Madang. He is a Business Management Graduate from a University in the
Philippines and has very little experience in high impact agriculture development projects. In his 21⁄2
year employment in PNG, he was engaged by Mr Wong, CEO of CVL to prepare the Agriculture Plan as
well as all the Environmental Submissions to DEC.’170

It continues: ‘It took Mr Lujero three (3) months to prepare the Development Plan. He said in evidence
that he never visited the site, but obtained all the information from Mr Wong, including conducting
other research ... This Plan in itself was not prepared in consultation with relevant authorities and lacks


quality in terms of its overall implementation schedules and if Lujero conducted this plan, the difficult
terrain and lack of road infrastructure was a major feat for CVL to conquer.’ 171

Reflecting on the fact that the plan was nonetheless approved by the Department of Agriculture and
Livestock by Deputy Secretary Francis Daink, the Commission observed: ‘I find that Mr Daink should be
held accountable for approving a plan that is not feasible to implement in so far as 112,000 hectares are
concerned. There should be a reasonable size of the area that is considered arable for commercial crops
and not in the way this desktop document was designed to fool state agencies responsible for proper
vetting, and in this case DAL failed in its duties to carefully evaluate the project document.’ 172

Turning now to the landowner group partnering with Continental Ventures. According to the
Commission, the land ‘is said to be owned by 11 landowning groups consisting of about 500 members
and those clans are namely: Wamer clan, Ambos clan, Karait Igir clan, Mou clan, Kupiakir clan, Karait-
Maipot clan, Muan clan, Seiwaki clan, Berwet clan, Waen clan and Lou clan’. 173

Urasir Resources Limited’s shareholders appear to consist of landowners from the affected area.
However, the Commission observes that there was significant conflict between factions within Urasir
Resources Limited.

The Commission also found that Continental Ventures Limited was intricately involved in Urasir
Resources Limited’s affairs. For example, the Commission claims they ‘initiated and funded the meeting
to appoint Chairman and new Directors to the company’. 174 It was also noted by the Commission that
Continental Ventures Limited retained in its possession ‘ILG [Incorporated Land Group] certificates,
SABL Title, The Project Agreement and The Agriculture Sub-lease’.175 Indeed the Commission went so far
as to state Continental Ventures ‘failed completely to ensure transparency and good governance in its
dealing with the landowners of the SABL project area’. 176

When turning its attention to the process by which the SABL was secured, along with the sublease, the
Commission notes a number of issues. The first relates to landowner consent.

While, as noted above, it is a legal requirement in Papua New Guinea that the government secures
informed consent from landowners before issuing a SABL, evidence in this case indicates the developer,
Continental Ventures, was directly involved in procuring landowner signatures, using what has been
described as coercive tactics.

The chairman of Urasir Resources Limited, Mr Serenus Sokrim, informed the Commission that ‘with the
developer in the house, he was really forced to sign that [consent] document quickly. He asked the
developer if he could give him time so that he will really read the contents of the paper and he will sign.
He was forced and told to sign that time at that instance ... He was told that the day had already lapsed
and by tomorrow they have to return so he had to sign. ... He [developer] gave them [landowners]
K900.00 in the meeting that was to pay for the pigs and food and the ladies who prepared the meals for
that day.’177

The Commission also cites evidence that points to a close and inappropriate relationship between
Continental Ventures Limited and Lands Department officials. For example, Simon Malo, the director of
the Customary Lands Division, states in correspondence to a colleague at the Provincial Lands and
Planning Branch that the developer was funding his trips to mobilise the customary land for a SABL:
‘The request to mobilize land was made after a successful lodgement of 52 Incorporated Land Groups
applications by the landowner company Chairman. Continental Ventures Limited funded the trip for me
as Acting Director Acquisition with Acting Manager, Leases to assist in mobilizing the land for the
purpose stipulated in the request letter ... All data collected was brought back by ... two officers and a
Land Investigation Report was compiled for all clan owning groups. The two officers adopted a
technique used in West and East Sepik Provinces as well as East and West New Britain Provinces
whereby one report is compiled for all landowning groups and it has proven to have no discrepancies.’


The receipt of funding from Continental Ventures Limited generated the potential for conflicts of interest
within the Lands Department. It also points to a recurring theme of officials from this department
appearing to work in partnership with project developers, rather than as impartial actors delivering on
their legal mandate to ensure customary land is carefully managed in a sustainable manner for the
benefit of communities.

The work of Lands Department officials when attempting to mobilise the customary land for the
subsequent leases was heavily criticised by the Commission. According to the Commission, the
aforementioned Land Investigation Report produced by Malo following his Continental Ventures-funded
trip ‘stated that the landowners were willing to lease the land for 99 years to the State so that it can then
be leased back to them under a SABL in the name of their landowner company being URL or Urasir
Resources Limited who can then sublease to potential developers as partners of the landowners. The LIR
is unsigned but contains a Schedule of [Customary] Owners which has not been signed either.’ 178

The Commission notes: ‘We make adverse findings against Mr Simon Malo for being so reckless in his
handling of the Land Investigation Report. He should be disciplined for the role played in preparing a
blank LIR bearing no signature and including the Recommendation for Alienability with no reservation
made for the customary rights over the land to continue.’179

Despite the deficient Land Investigation Report, the Commission notes: ‘On 10 March 2011, the
Provincial Administrator of Madang, Mr Bernard Lange endorsed the LIR by signing the
Recommendation as to Alienability recommending a 99 year lease to be granted to URL ... He did not
conduct any due diligence on the report as he was only provided the page with the Recommendation to
sign on and return to DLPP [Department of Lands and Physical Planning] for their action.’ 180

A SABL was issued to Urasir Resources Limited and a sublease then was issued to Continental Ventures
Limited. The sublease was for a period of 66 years commencing 17 March 2011, with a rent of K2 per
hectare per annum, with the first payment due on 1 January 2012. 181 The lease also provides for payment
of royalties.

The Commission makes special note of several provisions in the sublease. It notes: ‘An interesting clause
is clause 20 which provides for assignments and mortgages and for subleases to be given by the lessee
being Continental Venture Limited without prior written consent of the landlord being Urasir Resources
Limited.’182 It also states ‘Clause 24 of the sublease relates to Special Conditions which states, amongst
others, that within 60 days of the execution of the sublease, plantation activities shall commence and
the tenants are allowed exclusive rights to harvest, transport, market and sell all forest produce,
inclusive of industrial timber currently on the land and shall collect, own and use all revenues for the
sales of this forest produce under its own discretion under the sublease’. 183

The Commission discusses the significant levels of control that Continental Ventures appeared to enjoy
and the oppressive nature of the proposed arrangements: ‘It appears that the project is a genuine project
and the SABL grantee is a genuine landowner company but the twist appears to have occurred when the
sub lease was issued or granted whereby CVL was given absolute power and rights to the exclusion of
the landowner company except for the benefits from the business opportunities in dividends, royalties
and levies or what have you. Control of operations was vested in CVL by virtue of both the project
development agreement and the sublease agreement of the SABL.’ 184

Reflecting on the evidence, the Commission concluded: ‘The C.O.I. recommends revocation of SABL
Portion 16C issued in the name of URASIR RESOURCES LIMITED because the fundamental requirement
of the Land Investigation Process, the grant under Section 11 of the Land Act and subsequently the
registration and the Issuance of Title under Section 102 of the Land Act was fundamentally flawed and is
null and void.’185


It adds: ‘We recommend that the Landgroup engage a reputable and transparent Developer/Investor
that has the agricultural capability and the financial resources to develop commercial crops within a
reasonable and sizeable hectare of land conducive to yield better crop which will bring tangible
economic development to the most neglected and undeveloped community.’ 186

Having summarised the evidence relating to large-scale acquisitions of land, attention will turn to other
aspects of Giant Kingdom group operations that prompt concerns outside of logging, agriculture and
land.




International auditing firm Deloitte has raised concerns over the financial statements of Wewak
Agricultural Development Limited, which it reviewed for the year 2013. 187 At the time, Ting Chiong Ming
was both an ultimate shareholder of Wewak Agricultural Development Limited and a director.

Deloitte noted that it was unable to obtain sufficient evidence pertaining to the company’s financial
statements in 2012 and as a result was not able to perform testing on the assertions for 2013. The audit for
the financial year 2012 was conducted by a local company in Papua New Guinea, Niuguni Business
Consultants, which also states it helps to manage the tax affairs of Wewak Agricultural Development
Limited. In contrast to Deloitte, it maintains that it had access to sufficient evidence to confirm the
accuracy of the 2012 financial statements.188 It is unclear why the evidence was not available for Deloitte.

Turning back to 2013, Deloitte also noted it was unable to obtain evidence to substantiate the parent
entity’s claim it would provide financial support in the event the company was unable to extinguish its
current and maturing liabilities.

As a result of the lack of evidence presented to it, Deloitte notes that it is unable to verify key lines in the
financial statements. The relevant excerpt is provided below.




Deloitte concludes: ‘Because of the significant matters described in the Basis for Disclaimer of Opinion
paragraph we have not been able to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide a basis for
an audit opinion.’189

Subsequent annual returns filed with the Investment Promotion Authority in 2014 and 2015 do not
include financial statements or an auditor’s report.


In this section information is provided on the financial and non-financial entities providing professional
services to the Giant Kingdom group, which appear to have AML duties under Malaysian 190 or Papua
New Guinean191 law. There is no suggestion that any of these entities have acted in an improper way or
have breached any AML duties that may apply to them. This information is provided in order to identify
corporate actors that appear to be specifically exposed to the risks present within the Giant Kingdom
group, in order to assist these actors manage and respond to these risks.

In Table 8, we provide a list of financial institutions that have provided credit to the Giant Kingdom
group. This information is extracted from company information provided by the Companies Commission
of Malaysia. In this table we also identify the recipient company, and the amount of credit provided,
where known.


In Table 9, we provide a list of financial, accounting, corporate and legal service providers that have
provided services to Giant Kingdom group associated companies. In this table we identify the service
provider’s name, the type of service provided and the service user company.


Based on the evidence reviewed, the risk alert finds:

    ● There is a serious risk that both the Wewak Turubu and Wammy Forest Clearance Authorities
      were unlawfully issued in breach of key requirements of the Forestry Act 1991.
    ● There is a high risk that Global Kingdom group companies have been involved in illegal logging
      within the Wewak Turubu and Wammy area FCAs.
    ● There is also a substantial risk that the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority has failed to ensure
      the terms and conditions of the logging licences are being fulfilled and has failed in its duty to
      take enforcement action.


Furthermore, as a result of the evidence relating to Giant Kingdom group logging operations in Papua
New Guinea, this risk alert finds:

    ● There is a high risk that assets derived from Giant Kingdom group’s logging operations in Papua
      New Guinea have entered international supply chains and the international financial system.
    ● Malaysia, in particular, is a highly exposed jurisdiction to financial flows emerging from the Giant
      Kingdom group’s logging operations.


The risk alert also reviewed evidence relating to the Giant Kingdom group’s role in the acquisition of
long-term leases over customary land in Papua New Guinea. The following conclusions were reached:

    ● There is a credible risk that Giant Kingdom group companies Wewak Agriculture Development
      Limited, Global Elite Limited and Continental Ventures Limited colluded with government
      officials in the illegal acquisition of customary land.
    ● From the evidence surveyed, the long-term leases were secured without the free, prior and
      informed consent of customary landowners. The leases feature terms that are highly oppressive.
    ● There is a high risk that Giant Kingdom group companies have been funding the activity of
      officials from the Department of Lands and Physical Planning and the Royal Papua New Guinea
      Constabulary.


This risk alert also notes with concern serious allegations made by impacted landowners that police
funded by Giant Kingdom group have used violence and torture to intimidate protesting communities, a
claim which the Giant Kingdom group denies.

These findings are set against a broader environment of systematic malfeasance in Papua New Guinea’s
logging industry. The Bank of Papua New Guinea has stated that logging in Papua New Guinea is a high-
risk area owing to systematic evidence of illegal logging, corruption and human rights abuses. It has
stated that under the Forestry Act 1991, illegal logging is a predicate offence.

Accordingly, this risk alert recommends that businesses that have (a) regulatory obligations under anti-
money laundering provisions, and/or (b) a duty to avoid supply chains impacted by serious human
rights risks, undertake enhanced due diligence with respect to all current and future commercial
engagements with the Giant Kingdom group.

In particular it is recommended that:

    ● Entities which are regulated by AML rules rigorously establish the source of wealth and the source
      of funds of Giant Kingdom group entities. This ought to include enhanced steps that substantively
      establish that the assets, wealth or funds involved in the relationship are not, or will not, be


      derived from logging operations in Papua New Guinea, whether directly or indirectly.
    ● Regulated entities ensure when boarding and monitoring Giant Kingdom group companies that
      an enhanced level of due diligence is applied to the account on an ongoing basis.
    ● Regulated entities that have historical business dealings with Giant Kingdom group should review
      all regulated transactions and report any suspicious activity to the relevant country-level
      financial intelligence unit.
    ● Any entity commercially engaged with Giant Kingdom group companies that has a human rights
      commitment should consider deboarding this customer or client.
    ● Regulatory authorities in Malaysia and Papua New Guinea should conduct a field review of all
      regulated entities exposed to Giant Kingdom group operations, to ensure appropriate steps were
      taken when boarding and monitoring group entities given the high apparent levels of risk, which
      ought to have been apparent given the public documentation available on this conglomerate.
    ● Given the systematic failures observed within the PNGFA, the Government of Papua New Guinea
      should conduct an extensive and transparent. investigation to identify the source of these
      institutional failings.




A copy of this Risk Assessment was sent to Mr Ting Chiong Ming and to Global Elite Limited and Summit
Agriculture at their registered addresses; no reply was received.

Copies were also sent to the chair of the National Forest Board and the managing director of the Papua
New Guinea Forest Authority; no replies were received.


1 Supporting sources are set out in section 2.1.
2 Supporting sources are set out in section 2.2.
3 This data is extracted from SGS Log Export Monitoring Reports for the years 2011–2022.

4 ‘About us’, Giant Kingdom Group, n.d. Available online: www.giantkingdom.com

5 Full profile available online: https://www.ulster.ac.uk/staff/kak-lasslett

6 Available online: https://pngiportal.org/

7 Available online: https://pngiforests.org/

8 Available online: https://aleph.occrp.org/

9 Available online: https://app.seamlesshorizons.com/

10 See Lasslett, K. (2018). The Crimes of Urbanisation: Researching Corruption, Violence and Urban Conflict .

Abingdon: Routledge.
11 Questions were sent by email to Giant Kingdom group and to their corporate representative. A hard copy was sent

to the registered Post Office box address for the Giant Kingdom group companies domiciled in Papua New Guinea.
12 Notice of Change of Shareholders, Summit Agriculture Limited, 1 July 2009; Annual Return 2015, Summit

Agriculture Limited, 30 May 2016.
13 Certificate of Good Standing, Summit Agriculture Limited, accessed on 8 March 2023.

14 Consent of Shareholders of Proposed Company, Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited, 22 April 2008.

15 Annual Return 2015, Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Limited, 30 June 2016.

16 Notice of Change of Shareholder, Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, 24 September 2008.

17 Notice of Change of Shareholder, Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, 9 November 2010.

18 Annual Return 2015, Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, 19 April 2016; Certificate of Good Standing, Wewak

Agriculture Development Limited, accessed on 5 May 2023.
19 Certificate of Good Standing, Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, accessed on 5 May 2023.

20 Consent of Shareholder of Proposed Company, Continental Venture Limited, 12 August 2010.

21 Annual Return 2013, Continental Venture Limited, 30 June 2014; Annual Return 2016, Continental Venture

Limited, 20 April 2017.
22 Certificate of Good Standing, Continental Venture Limited, accessed on 2 May 2023.

23 Consent of Shareholder of Proposed Company, Global Elite Limited, 1 March 2010.

24 Form C6 Note of Share Transfer, Global Elite Limited, 2 June 2023.

25 Consent of Shareholder of Proposed Company, Ackland Alliance Limited, 5 July 2010.

26 Notice of Change of Shareholder, Ackland Alliance Limited, 30 December 2010. Note that Ackland Alliance

Limited’s records have not been reregistered following the upgrade of Papua New Guinea’s electronic corporate
registry. However, a current role search conducted through the IPA corporate registry on 21 June 2023 indicates
Chiong Ming Ting, Nyi Then and Hui Teck Lau remain current shareholders.
27 Certificate of Good Standing, Elite Marine Limited, accessed on 30 March 2023

28 Certificate of Good Standing, Foyston Development Limited, accessed on 17 May 2023.

29 Company Extract, GE Development Limited, accessed on 25 April 2023.

30 Certificate of Good Standing, GE Development Limited, accessed on 3 May 2023.

31 Certificate of Good Standing, Grand Agriculture Limited, accessed on 3 May 2023.

32 Notice of Change of Shareholder, Greenlands Development Limited, 2 March 2012.

33 Certificate of Good Standing, Greenlands Development Limited, accessed on 3 May 2023.

34 Certificate of Good Standing, Kukusang Plywood Limited, 4 May 2023.

35 Certificate of Good Standing, Mapac Industrial Limited, accessed on 3 May 2023.

36 Certificate of Good Standing, Pacific Agro Capital Limited, accessed on 3 May 2023.

37 Certificate of Good Standing, Sepik Palm Oil Limited, accessed on 17 May 2023.

38 Certificate of Good Standing, Global Star Corporation, accessed on 3 May 2023.

39 Certificate of Good Standing, Pacific Elite Investment, accessed on 30 June 2023

40 WADL Holdings Limited, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.

Available online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10146133
41 WADL Investments Limited, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.

Available online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10139001
42 SP Parts Trading Limited, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.

Available online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10138975
43 Glacier Worldwide Ltd, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Available

online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10159701


44 Foyston Holdings Inc, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Available
online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10141774
45 Woodside Capital Holdings, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.

Available online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10142702
46 Callington Pacific Holdings, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.

Available online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10147312
47 Giant Kingdom International Ltd, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.

Available online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10136776
48 Global Elite Limited, Forests Database, PNGi. Available online: https://pngiforests.org/company/global-elite

49 Summit Agriculture Limited, Forests Database, PNGi. Available online: https://pngiforests.org/company/summit-

agriculture
50 Giant Kingdom Holdings Sdn Bhd, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 1 May 2023.

51 Giant Kingdom Holdings Sdn Bhd, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 1 May 2023.

52 Collinwood Realty, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

53 11,500,000 preference shares are held by Giant Kingdom Holdings, there is an additional 100,000 ordinary shares

issued to Giant Kingdom Property (30,000), Luk Shun Development (50,000) and Bumi Kenyalang Management
(20,000).
54 Giant Kingdom Capital, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 2 May 2023.

55 Giant Kingdom Realty, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

56 GK Agriculture Sdn Bhd, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 3 May 2023.

57 Giant Kingdom Holdings Sdn Bhd, Financial Statements for the Period Ended 31 December 2015, Companies

Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 9 April 2023.
58 GK Worldwide Trading, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

59 GK Shipping, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

60 Highland Machinery, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

61 Luk Shun Development, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

62 Mega Power Machinery, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

63 Pearl Estate, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

64 Sematan Resort, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

65 2,200,200 preference shares are held by Giant Kingdom Holdings, an additional 100,000 ordinary shares are held

by Giant Kingdom Property. Tiong Ching Ming is a director, but not a shareholder in Giant Kingdom Property. See
Giant Kingdom Property, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 2 May 2023.
66 SR Equatorial, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 25 April 2023.

67 GK Green Limited, Labuan Financial Services Authority. Available online: https://www.labuanfsa.gov.my/areas-

of-business/financial-services/commodity-trading/list-of-labuan-international-commodity-trading-
companies/details?id=c8575de9-51a5-40f5-8c78-c21f7a1354ba
68 Giant Kingdom Holdings Sdn Bhd, Financial Statements for the Period Ended 31 December 2015, Companies

Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 9 April 2023.
69 Financial Analysis and Supervision Unit (2017). Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism National Risk

Assessment. Bank of Papua New Guinea. See p.19. Available online: https://www.bankpng.gov.pg/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/Money-Laundering-and-Financing-of-Terrorism-National-Risk-Assessment-4.pdf
70 Ibid., p.93

71 Ibid., p.89

72 Ibid., p.89

73 Transparency International Papua New Guinea (2011). Forest Governance Integrity Baseline Report. Available

online: https://pngforests.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/forest-governance-integrity-report-ti.pdf
74 Hoare, A, (Ed.) (2020). Chatham House Forest Policy Assessment, Papua New Guinea. Chatham House. Available

online: https://forestgovernance.chathamhouse.org/media/data-download/Forest-Policy-Assessment-PNG.pdf
75 Mousseau, F. and Lau, P. (2016). The Great Timber Heist: The Logging Industry in Papua New Guinea. The

Oakland Institute. Available online:
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/PNG_Great_Timber_Heist_final_web.pdf;
Mousseau, F. and Bracale, H. (2018). The Great Timber Heist Continued: Tax Evasion and Illegal Logging in Papua
New Guinea. The Oakland Institute. Available online:
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/great_timber_heist_cont.pdf
76 ‘IRC adds more financial crimes to logging companies’ charge sheet’, Act Now!, 11 May 2021. Available online:

https://actnowpng.org/blog/blog-entry-irc-adds-more-financial-crimes-logging-companies’-charge-sheet


77 ‘Major logging operator Charged K140m for tax evasion’, Internal Revenue Commission, 26 June 2023. Available
online: https://irc.gov.pg/news/media-releases/major-logging-operator-charged-k140m-for-tax-evasion
78 NEPCon (2017). Timber Legality Risk Assessment: Papua New Guinea. NEPCon. Available online:

https://www.preferredbynature.org/sites/default/files/library/2017-08/NEPCon-TIMBER-PapuaNewGuinea-Risk-
Assessment-EN-V1.1.pdf
79 Global Witness (2018). A Major Liability: Illegal logging in Papua New Guinea threatens China’s timber sector and

global reputation. Available online: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/forests/major-liability-illegal-
logging-papua-new-guinea-threatens-chinas-timber-sector-and-global-reputation/
80 Forest Trends (2021). Timber Legality Risk Dashboard: Papua New Guinea . Available online: https://www.forest-

trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Papua-New-Guinea-Timber-Legality-Risk-Dashboard-IDAT-Risk-1.pdf
81 Forestry Act 1991. Available online: http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/consol_act/fa1991139/

82 Forestry Act 1991, Section 87.

83 Forestry Act 1991, Sections 56–60.

84 Forestry Act 1991, as amended, Section 90A.

85 Forestry Act 1991, as amended, Section 90A(1).

86 Forestry Act 1991, as amended, Section 90B(22)(b).

87 Forestry Act 1991, as amended, Section 90B(9)(d).

88 Forestry Act 1991, as amended, Section 90B(9)(d).

89 Papua New Guinea Forestry Authority (2017). Summary Report: Papua New Guinea Forest Authority Retreat.

Available online:
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/pg/9975b8f4b028bcfc7811ffd362639123176bf331ffacb
65cb1b8f5f61cb6d04d.pdf
90 Papua New Guinea Forest Authority (2019). Papua New Guinea Forestry Summit Report, p.74.

91 Global Witness (2018). A Major Liability. Available online:

https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/forests/major-liability-illegal-logging-papua-new-guinea-threatens-
chinas-timber-sector-and-global-reputation/
92 ‘Moratorium on new FCAs a step in right direction’, Act Now!, 9 March 2023. Available online:

https://actnowpng.org/blog/moratorium-on-new-fcas
93 See https://pngiforests.org/licence/wewak-turubu and https://pngiforests.org/licence/wammy accessed on 13

June 2023.
94 ‘Operations’, New Britain Palm Oil, n.d. Available online: https://www.nbpol.com.pg/operations.html

95 ‘Operations’, New Britain Palm Oil, n.d. Available online: https://www.nbpol.com.pg/operations.html

96 Filer, C. (2011). ‘The political construction of a land grab in Papua New Guinea’, International Conference on

Global Land Grabbing, 6–8 April 2011. Available online: https://landmatrix.org/media/uploads/colin-filer-
revised9.pdf
97 Global Witness (2017). Stained Trade. Available online:

https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/forests/stained-trade/, p.36
98 Global Witness (2017). Stained Trade. Available online:

https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/forests/stained-trade/, p.36
99 Inovasdigital (2023). An Update on Oil Palm Expansion in PNG, April 2023, p. 18

100 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 831.
101 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 830.
102 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 831.
103 Bank of Papua New Guinea (2017). Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism National Risk Assessment .

Available online: https://www.bankpng.gov.pg/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Money-Laundering-and-Financing-
of-Terrorism-National-Risk-Assessment-4.pdf, p. 89.
104 https://pngiforests.org/licence/wammy accessed on 12 June 2023.

105 The Secrets of Papua New Guinea’s Sepik River, ABC Foreign Correspondent, 9 March 2023. Video and transcript

available online: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-09/secrets-of-papua-new-guineas-sepik-river/102076654
106 Nelson, P. et al. (2014). ‘Oil palm and deforestation in Papua New Guinea’, Conservation Letters, 7(3), 188–195.

doi: 10.1111/conl.12058
107 Ibid.

108 Forestry Act 1991, as amended, Section 90B(9)(d).

109 SGS Log Export Monitoring reports for 2015–22. Available online: https://pngforests.com/sgs/


110 The Secrets of Papua New Guinea’s Sepik River, ABC Foreign Correspondent, 9 March 2023. Video and transcript
available online: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-09/secrets-of-papua-new-guineas-sepik-river/102076654
111 The Secrets of Papua New Guinea’s Sepik River, ABC Foreign Correspondent, 9 March 2023. Available online:

https://youtu.be/URckE1PnHzA?t=753
112 See ‘Summit Agriculture Limited’, PNGi Forests. Available online: https://pngiforests.org/company/summit-

agriculture
113 These figures are taken from the Global Witness report A Major Liability, which relies on data from the Papua New

Guinea Forestry Research Institute’s research in permanent sample plots. The plot methodology is described in Fox,
J., Yosi, C., Nimiago, P., Oavika, F., Pokana, J., Lavong, K., Keenan, R. (2010). ‘Assessment of aboveground carbon in
primary and selectively harvested tropical forest in Papua New Guinea’. Biotropica, 42(4), pp. 410–419.
114 Global Witness (2018). A Major Liability, see p.17. Available online:

https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/forests/major-liability-illegal-logging-papua-new-guinea-threatens-
chinas-timber-sector-and-global-reputation/
115 Forestry Act 1991, as amended.

116 Notice of Change of Shareholder, Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, 24 September 2008.

117 Notice of Change of Shareholder, Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, 9 November 2010.

118 Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, Certificate of Good Standing, Registrar of Companies Papua New

Guinea. Accessed on 5 May 2023.
119 WADL Holdings Limited, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,

available online: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10146133 (accessed on 21 May 2023); WADL Investments
Limited, Offshore Leaks Database, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, available online
https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10139001 (accessed on 21 May 2023).
120 Giant Kingdom Holdings Sdn Bhd, Corporate Profile, Companies Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 1 May

2023; Giant Kingdom Holdings Sdn Bhd, Financial Statements for the Period Ended 31 December 2015, Companies
Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 9 April 2023; GK Agriculture Sdn Bhd, Corporate Profile, Companies
Commission of Malaysia, accessed on 3 May 2023.
121 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme.
122 Maniwa v Malijiwi [2014] PGNC 25; N5687 (4 July 2014).

123 Lau v Maniwa [2016] PGSC 47; SC1528 (31 August 2016).

124 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 841.
125 Manning, M. and Hughes, P. (2008). ‘Acquiring land for public purposes in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.’ In

AusAID (ed.), Making Land Work — Volume Two: Case Studies on Customary Land and Development in the Pacific,
pp. 241–263. Canberra: AusAID.
126 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea , 1975. Available online:

www.paclii.org/pg/legis/consol_act/cotisopng534/
127 See, Filer, C. (2017). ‘The formation of a land grab policy network in Papua New Guinea.’ In S. McDonnell, M.G.

Allen and C. Filer (eds), Kastom, Property and Ideology: Land Transformations in Melanesia, pp. 169–204. Canberra:
ANU Press.
128 Para. 18, Lau v Maniwa [2016] PGSC 47; SC1528 (31 August 2016).

129 See, Lasslett, K. (2018). The Crimes of Urbanisation: Researching Corruption, Violence and Urban Conflict .

Abingdon: Routledge.
130 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 841.
131 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 840.
132 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 864.
133 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 865.
134 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 865.
135 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 865.
136 Oxfam Australia (2014). Turubu Oil Palm Project: A snapshot of community views. Oxfam Australia. p.2


137 Maniwa v Malijiwi [2014] PGNC 25. Available online: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/pg/cases/PGNC/2014/25.html
138 See para.22, Maniwa v Malijiwi [2014] PGNC 25. Available online: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-

bin/sinodisp/pg/cases/PGNC/2014/25.html
139Lau v Maniwa [2016] PGSC 47. Available online: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-

bin/sinodisp/pg/cases/PGSC/2016/47.html
140 See para.28, Lau v Maniwa [2016] PGSC 47. Available online: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-

bin/sinodisp/pg/cases/PGSC/2016/47.html
141 See para.29, Lau v Maniwa [2016] PGSC 47. Available online: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-

bin/sinodisp/pg/cases/PGSC/2016/47.html
142 Ibid.

143 ‘Wewak Turubu’, PNGi Forests. Available online: https://pngiforests.org/licence/wewak-turubu

144 ‘Turubu a “Ghost Plantation”’, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, 10 January 2020. Available online:

https://landmatrix.org/media/uploads/turubu-a-ghost-plantation-post-courier.pdf
145 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 106.
146 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 108.
147 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 107.
148 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 108.
149 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 110.
150 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 104.
151 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 112.
152 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 105.
153 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 105.
154 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 105.
155 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 111.
156 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 112.
157 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 110.
158 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 109.
159 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 110.
160 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 110.
161 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 108.
162 Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 112.
163 ‘Wammy’, PNGi Forests. Available online: https://pngiforests.org/licence/wammy

164 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou, Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business

Lease Scheme, 2013, p. 872.
165 Consent of Shareholder of Proposed Company, Continental Venture Limited, 12 August 2010.

166 Certificate of Good Standing, Continental Venture Limited, accessed on 2 May 2023.

167 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, pp. 890–1.


  Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture
168

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, pp. 890–1.
169 https://www.nbpol.com.pg/operations.html accessed on 26 May, 2023.
170 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture
Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 898.
171 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 898.
172 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 898.
173 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 883.
174 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 874.
175 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 874.
176 C Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 875.
177 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, pp. 877–78.
178 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 884.
179 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 886.
180 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, pp. 886-87.
181 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 896.
182 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 895.
183 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 895.
184 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 880.
185 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 899.
186 Commissioner Nicholas Mirou (2013). Papua New Guinea Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture

Business Lease Scheme, Commission of Inquiry into the Special Agriculture Business Lease Scheme, p. 899.
187 Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2013.

188 Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2012.

189 Wewak Agriculture Development Limited, Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2013.

190 See Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001.

191 See Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism Act 2015.


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